This paper investigates the impact of institutional trading volume on the cross-section of stock returns. I construct a measure that evaluates the percentage of total trading volume of a stock accounted for by institutional trades. Using a large sample of firms from 1980-2005, I find strong evidence that the strength of stock market anomalies such as price momentum, post-earnings announcement drift, value premium, and investment anomaly is decreasing in institutional trading volume. Additionally, the effects of institutional trading volume are stronger than those of institutional ownership, the major measure of institutional investor participation in the finance literature. These findings suggest that institutional trading significantly improves stock price efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of institutional investors has motivated numerous studies on the effects of institutional investor participation on financial markets. Most of these studies measure institutional investor participation using a stock's institutional ownership -i.e., percentage of shares outstanding of the stock held by institutional investors. In this paper, I examine a different aspect of institutional investor participation that has been largely ignored by the current finance literature. Specifically, I study the percentage of trading volume of a stock accounted for by institutional investors and the impact of institutional trading volume on stock market anomalies. Institutional trading volume can have significant impact on stock price efficiency and therefore stock market anomalies. Institutions are generally considered more sophisticated traders than individuals. For example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find a strong positive relation between change in institutional ownership and future stock returns, suggesting that institutional investors have the ability to predict stock returns. 1 Institutional ownership and institutional trading volume are both important aspects of institutional investor participation. Although institutional trading volume has received little attention from financial researchers, its impact on stock price efficiency and stock market anomalies can be greater than that of institutional ownership. This is because institutional trading directly moves stock prices but institutional holding does not. Let's take post-earnings announcement drift as an example.
If market under-react to an earnings announcement, then such under-reaction will lead to a postannouncement drift in the same direction as earnings announcement return when prices gradually adjust to the fundamental value. When institutions observe the under-reaction and trade on earnings announcement return, their trading moves prices towards fundamentals, reducing or eliminating the post-earnings announcement drift. In contrast, if institutions observe the under-reaction but simply act as passive shareholders without trading the stock, then under-reaction or the post-earnings announcement drift will remain intact.
Individual investors, in contrast, have been documented to lose significantly from their trading and suffer a number of behavioral biases when they trade (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) . If institutions are more sophisticated than individuals, then institutional investor participation can speed up information diffusion into stock prices and improve stock price efficiency. As a result, institutional investor participation will reduce the magnitude of observed stock market anomalies if these anomalies are associated with price inefficiency.
In this paper, I empirically investigate the effects of institutional trading volume on major stock market anomalies. I construct the FITV measure (fraction of institutional trading volume) that evaluates for a firm-quarter the percentage of total trading volume accounted for by institutional investors. Specifically, for each stock-quarter I use quarterly institutional holdings from Thomson Reuters' 13f database and calculate an institution's trading volume as the absolute value of its change in holdings over the quarter. The absolute value aims to capture trading volume of the institution whether it buys or sells the stock over the quarter. I then sum up trading volumes of all institutions and divide by total trading volume of the stock-quarter (from CRSP) to obtain the FITV measure.
Section 2 describes the construction of the FITV measure.
It is worth noticing that the FITV measure excludes intraquarter round-trip institutional trades. For example, if an institution purchases and then sells 1% of a stock's shares within a quarter, then the FITV measure will not include these two trades because they are not reflected in quarterend holdings. Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) and Puckett and Yan (2011) Next, I examine the effects of the FITV measure on four major stock market anomalies. I first examine price momentum (past winners outperform past losers) and post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) because they are among the most investigated and robust anomalies in stock markets (Fama, 1998 and high FITV stocks is also statistically and economically significant (0.60 percent, t-stat 2.80).
These findings are also robust with the multivariate regression analyses that control for firm characteristics and other variables documented to affect value premium and investment anomaly.
Overall, the empirical results consistently suggest that the strength of stock market anomalies is strongly decreasing in institutional trading volume.
A number of papers find that stocks with higher institutional ownership exhibit weaker anomalous stock returns (e.g., Alangar, Bathala, and Rao, 1999; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky, 2000; Collins, Gong and Haribar, 2003; Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005; Nagel, 2005 This paper makes important contribution to the literature of institutional investors. It is the first study to show that fraction of institutional trading volume, which has been largely ignored by the current literature, has significant impact on stock market anomalies. While this paper focuses on stock market anomalies, future studies can explore the effects of institutional trading volume on other stock market phenomena.
This paper also makes two contributions to the literature of stock market efficiency. First, the empirical results provide supporting evidence of institutional investor participation improving stock price efficiency (e.g., Alangar et al., 1999; Bartov et al., 2000; Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti, 2004; Nagel, 2005; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009 ). Second, the decreased strength of all anomalies examined in stocks with low institutional trading volumes is also consistent with these anomalies being associated with price inefficiencies. The findings in this paper therefore also shed light on the large literature that explores the risk-and behavioral-based explanations of stock market anomalies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the construction of the FITV measure. Section 3 describes data and sample construction. Section 4 examines the effects of institutional trading volume on stock market anomalies, and Section 5 concludes.
MEASURING FRACTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING VOLUME
I construct the FITV measure (fraction of institutional trading volume), which evaluates the percentage of trading volume of a firm-quarter accounted for by institutional trading, using the equation below. A caveat of the FITV measure is that it double counts the trades between two institutions. For example, if institution A sells 100 shares to institution B, then this trade will be counted twice as it is incorporated into the changes in holdings of both A and B. While it is difficult to evaluate the magnitude of double counting, this issue does not seem to have a big impact on my inferences.
Conceptually, double counting assigns greater weights to the trades with intensive participation of institutional traders, which is consistent with the goal of the measure. Empirically, since my tests 5 I carefully adjust for stock split during the quarter when constructing the FITV measure. Specifically, I calculate the numerator using change in shares holdings adjusted for stock split, expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. I then calculate quarterly share volume in the denominator as sum of monthly share volumes, expressed as percentages of shares outstanding of the months. To control for outliers, both numerator and denominator are winsorized at 99% cutoff points.
focus on cross-sectional comparison of the FITV measure, the inferences will be largely unaffected unless there is evidence that double counting varies significantly across individual stocks.
It is worth noticing that the FITV measure excludes round-trip institutional trades during a quarter. Specifically, FITV includes a trade with investment horizon longer than three months and excludes a trade with investment horizon shorter than one day (day-trading). For a trade with investment horizon between one day to three months, its probability of being captured by FITV is an increasing function of investment horizon. For example, assuming that trades occur randomly in a quarter, then a trade with investment horizon of two months will be included in FITV as long as it occurs in the second or the third month of the quarter (included with 2/3 probability). In contrast, a trade with investment horizon of one week will be included in FITV only when it occurs in the last week of the quarter (included with a probability of one-twelfth, or 8.3 percent). The chart below lists the corresponding probabilities for trades with different investment horizons. The Amihud illiquidity measure for a stock is constructed following Amihud (2002) using the following equation I apply the book-to-market ratio at fiscal year-end in calendar year t to the one-year period starting from the July of year t+1. Ret [-6,-1] for a firm-quarter is the six-month buy-and-hold returns up to the end of previous quarter. Beta is estimated annually with market model using daily stock returns in the previous calendar year. Adjusted analyst coverage for a firm-quarter is analyst coverage at the end of the previous quarter minus the average coverage of the firm's NYSE size quartile (Griffin and Lemmon, 2002) . Quarterly stock turnover is calculated by summing up monthly turnovers during the quarter, where monthly turnover is monthly share volume divided by shares outstanding. where r t is stock return on day t and Dvol t is dollar volume on day t. The illiquidity measure is calculated annually using all daily returns and dollar volumes in the previous year.
THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING VOLUME ON STOCK MARKET ANOMALIES (i) Summary Statistics

(ii) The Effect of Institutional Trading Volume on Price Momentum
The square-root adjustment in Equation (2) is proposed by Hasbrouck (2006) to address skewness of the original Amihud measure.
I examine the effect of institutional trading volume on price momentum using the rolling momentum strategy proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . At the beginning of each month of the sample period, an independent sort is used to rank stocks into terciles of the one-quarter lag FITV measures and deciles of past six-month returns. These two-dimensional portfolios are then 6 To eliminate outliers, I winsorize the book-to-market ratios at the 99th percentile as did in the literature. 7 I follow Amihud (2002) and drop the firms with less than 200 valid daily observations in the estimation window.
held for six months. To control for microstructure effects, I skip a month between portfolio formation and return measurement.
I calculate monthly returns of momentum portfolios using the decomposed buy-and-hold method proposed by Liu and Strong (2008) . Specifically, portfolio return in an individual month τ of the holding period (τ=2, 3,…, 6) is calculated as weighted-average of the month-τ stock returns with the weight being a stock's buy-and-hold return from month 1 to τ-1 in the holding period. This approach assumes that a portfolio, once formed, is not rebalanced in the holding period. In contrast, a commonly used approach that calculates portfolio return in each month as simple average of monthly stock returns ("rebalances method") actually assumes rebalancing the portfolio every month during the holding period. Table 2 reports for each portfolio the average monthly return and t-statistic calculated using Newey-West robust standard error with five lags. 9 8 Liu and Strong (2008) demonstrate that the "rebalance method" can create substantial biases especially in small or lowprice stocks because of the negative return autocorrelations in these stocks. They show that the rebalance method exaggerates size premium but underestimates price momentum. For robustness, I also repeat the tests in this paper with the rebalance method and obtain similar results.
The monthly momentum profit (Winner-Loser) is 1.52 percent (t-stat 6.86) for the lowest FITV tercile but only 1.06 percent (t-stat 4.87) for the highest FITV tercile. The difference in momentum profit between the lowest and highest FITV terciles is 0.46 percent (t-stat 2.94), both statistically and economically significant. To separate the effect of the FITV measure from that of institutional ownership, I repeat the sorting analysis using the residual FITV measure which is orthogonal to institutional ownership (described in Section 2). The results in Panel B of Table 2 show that momentum profit of the bottom ResFITV group exceeds the top group by 0.41 percent (t-stat 2.70). This result indicates that the effect of institutional trading volume persists after controlling for institutional ownership. 9 For robustness I also calculate Newey-West errors with different numbers of lags and the results are similar.
I further estimate multivariate Fama-Macbeth regressions to control for other variables that also affect momentum, such as firm size (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001 ), book-to-market ratio (Daniel and Titman, 1999) , analyst coverage (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) , and stock turnover (Lee and Swaminthan, 2000) . I estimate cross-sectional regressions of quarterly stock returns and report time-series means of the coefficients and associated t-statistics calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors with five lags. To control for non-linearity of the variables and to ease comparison of economic significances, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and transform all the independent variables into ranks uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. One month is skipped before return measurement to control for the microstructure effects. Table 3 presents the results on the regressions. The variable of interest is the interaction between FITV and past six-month returns. I expect the coefficient on the interaction to be significantly negative based on the negative association between FITV and momentum found with the sorting analysis ( Table 2) . The results of Model 1 show that, indeed, the coefficient of the interaction between FITV and past return is a significantly negative -4.00 (t-stat -4.46). This result persists when I control for firm characteristics including beta, firm size and book-to-market ratio in Model 2.
I also repeat the regression but with institutional ownership instead of the FITV measure in Model 3. The interaction between institutional ownership and past return is also significantly negative but much smaller than the FITV interactions in Models 1 and 2. These results suggest that institutional ownership also negatively impacts momentum but the effect is much weaker than that of FITV.
For a horse race between the FITV measure and institutional ownership, I include both the FITV interaction and the institutional ownership interaction in Model 4. I further include interactions of past returns with size, book-to-market ratio, turnover, and analyst coverage in Model 5 to control for the effects of these characteristics on price momentum. Interestingly, I observe that while the coefficient on the FITV interaction remains significantly negative, the coefficient on the ownership interaction becomes insignificantly positive after controlling for FITV. These results indicate that the effect of institutional ownership on momentum is largely due to its correlation with institutional trading volume.
The coefficients on the other interaction terms are consistent with the previous studies that momentum is stronger in smaller firms, growth firms, higher turnover firms, and firms with less analyst coverage. The economic significances of coefficients on the FITV interactions are also consistent with the sorting analyses in Table 2 . For example, in Model 5, the coefficient on the FITV interaction is -2.66 (t-stat -2.91), which suggests that quarterly momentum profit is about 1.58 percent stronger in the bottom FITV tercile than in the top FITV tercile.
(iii) The Effect of Institutional Trading Volume on Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
To summarize, the multivariate regression analyses in Table 3 confirm that the strength of price momentum is decreasing in institutional trading volume.
I examine the effect of institutional trading volume on post earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) using a rolling PEAD trading strategy proposed by Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) . Specifically, I construct an earnings shock measure for each firm-month as the four-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the [-2, 1] window centered on the firm's most recent earnings announcement. Daily abnormal return is calculated using the market model, where the market beta is estimated in the one-year window up to two months before the announcement. 11 10 The 1.58 percent is calculated as follows. Since the independent variables are transformed into ranks uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the gap of 1.58 percent is calculated as 0.9 (difference between the top and bottom pastreturn deciles) times 0.66 (difference between the top and bottom FITV terciles) times the coefficient of -2.66.
To avoid using 11 I use CRSP value-weighted index as the market portfolio. Firms with less than six months of stock returns in the estimation window are excluded to avoid estimation errors. stale earnings data, I drop a firm-month if the firm's most recent earnings announcement is more than three months away.
The PEAD strategy is similar to the rolling momentum strategy proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) except that the portfolios are formed on earnings shocks rather than past returns. At the beginning of each month, an independent sort is used to rank stocks into terciles of the onequarter lag FITV measure, and deciles of earnings shocks. The two-dimensional portfolios are held for six months, and PEAD is the difference in returns between the top and the bottom portfolios of earnings shock. Monthly portfolio returns are calculated using the decomposed buy-and-hold method proposed by Liu and Strong (2008) .
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In Panel A of Table 4 , I observe that PEAD is 0. Table 4 shows that PEAD is decreasing in the FITV measure, I expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be significantly negative. The independent variables also include interactions of earnings shock with institutional ownership and firm size because previous studies find that PEAD is stronger in stocks with lower institutional ownerships and smaller stocks (e.g., Bartov et al., 2000) . Table 5 reports the results of return regressions. Models 1 and 2 show that the coefficient on the interaction between FITV and earnings shock is significantly negative, and this result holds when I control for the commonly examined firm characteristics including beta, size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. These results are consistent with the negative relation between PEAD and institutional trading volume documented in the sorting analysis (Table 4) .
For a comparison, I also examine the effect of institutional ownership on PEAD in Model 3.
Consistent with Bartov et al. (2000) , I observe a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between institutional ownership and earnings shock. However, the coefficient (-2.37) is smaller than that on the FITV interaction (-2.70). Models 4 and 5 include both the FITV and ownership interactions. I further control for the effect of size on PEAD using an interaction term between firm size and earnings shock. Interestingly, the results show that after including the size interaction, the coefficient on the FITV interaction remains significantly negative but that on the ownership interaction becomes insignificantly negative (t-stat -0.69).
The economic significance of the regression coefficients is also consistent with sorting analyses in Table 4 . For example, in Model 5, the coefficient on the FITV interaction is -1.47 (t-stat -1.87), which suggests that post-earnings announcement drift is about 0.87 percent per quarter stronger in the bottom FITV tercile than in the top FITV tercile. 13 To summarize, both the sorting analyses (Table 4 ) and regression analyses (Tables 5) provide strong evidence that institutional trading volume has significantly negative impact on post-earnings announcement drift.
(iv) The Effect of Institutional Trading Volume on Value Premium
I first perform sorting analysis to examine the effect of institutional trading volume on value premium. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are independently sorted into terciles of the onequarter lag FITV measures and deciles of book-to-market ratios. Then the time-series means of the monthly portfolio returns and the associated t-statistics calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors are reported.
14 Panel A of Table 6 Table 6 .
I further perform multivariate Fama-Macbeth regressions to examine the effect of institutional trading volume on value premium. The dependent variables are monthly stock returns and the independent variable of interest is the interaction between FITV and book-to-market ratio. I predict the coefficient on the FITV interaction to be significantly negative because the sorting analysis in Table 6 suggests a negative relation between value premium and institutional trading volume. A cross-sectional regression of stock returns is estimated for each month and time-series 14 Since book-to-market ratio is annual measure and FITV is quarterly measure, the two-dimensional portfolios are formed quarterly and held for three months. I follow Liu and Strong (2008) and calculate monthly portfolio returns using the decomposed buy-and-hold method (discussed in Section 4(ii)). I also use the decomposed buy-and-hold method for the sub-portfolio analysis on investment anomaly in the next subsection. For robustness, I repeat the tests using the rebalance method and observe similar results.
means of the coefficients are reported. I also report associated t-statistics calculated using NeweyWest robust errors with five lags. The coefficients of the FITV interactions are also economically significant and in line with the sorting analyses in Table 6 . For example, in Model 5, the coefficient on the FITV interaction is -0.98, translating into a gap in monthly value premium of 0.58 percent between the lowest and the highest FITV terciles.
While these results confirm the robustness of the FITV effect, they suggest that the effect of institutional ownership on value premium is likely due the correlation between institutional ownership and institutional trading volume. 16 To summarize, both sorting analyses in Table 6 and multivariate regression analyses in Table 7 suggest that institutional trading volume strongly reduces value premium.
(v) The Effect of Institutional Trading Volume on Investment Anomaly
I examine the effect of institutional trading volume on investment anomaly using the corporate investment measure from Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) . Specifically, I define investment of a firm as its capital expenditure (Compustat annual item 128) divided by sales (annual item 12) and apply the investment of a fiscal year ending in calendar year t to the one-year period from July of year t + 1.
For robustness tests, I also repeat the tests using the alternative investment measures that scale capital expenditure by net property, plant, and equipment or asset values (Xing, 2008; Wu, Zhang, and Zhang, 2010) and observe similar results.
At the beginning of each quarter, firms are independently sorted into terciles of the onequarter lag FITV measures and deciles of investments. I then calculate time-series means of the monthly returns of the two-dimentional portfolios and the associated t-statistics using Newey-West robust standard errors with five lags. Panel A of Table 8 reports Table 8, I control for the effect of institutional ownership using the residual FITV measure and obtain results similar to those in Panel A. I also perform multivariate Fama-Macbeth regressions of monthly stock returns similar to those in the previous subsections. For brevity these results are not tabulated but they are consistent with the sorting analysis in Table 8 in terms of both statistical and economic significances.
To summarize, I find strong empirical results that institutional trading volume has significant effects on the stock market anomalies including momentum, post-earnings announcement drift, value premium, and investment anomaly. These findings provide supporting evidence that institutional trading improves stock price efficiency.
CONCLUSION
This paper is the first study that investigates the impact of institutional trading volume on stock market anomalies. I construct a quarterly measure that evaluates the percentage of total trading volume of a stock accounted for by institutional trading, and examine its effects on four major stock market anomalies. I find that all four anomalies, including price momentum, post-earnings announcement drift, value premium, and investment anomaly, are significantly weaker in stocks with higher fractions of institutional trading volumes. Additionally, value premium and investment anomaly exist only in stocks with low institutional trading volumes. These results are robust with both sorting analyses and multivariate regression analyses that control for firm characteristics and other factors documented to affect these anomalies.
This paper makes important contributions to the literature of institutional investors and the literature of stock market efficiency. I present evidence that fraction of institutional trading volume, which has been largely ignored by the current finance literature, has significant impact on stock market anomalies. Additionally, the effects of institutional trading volume are stronger than those of institutional ownership, the most commonly used measure of institutional investor participation in the current finance literature. The findings in this paper also suggest that institutional investor participation can improve stock price efficiency and therefore significantly weaken stock market anomalies associated with price inefficiencies. While this paper focuses on stock market anomalies, future studies can further explore the effects of institutional trading volume on other stock market phenomena or corporate events. The FITV measure (fraction of institutional trading volume) of a firm-quarter is the percentage of total trading volume accounted for by institutional trading. Institutional Ownership of a firm-quarter is the aggregate institutional ownership of the firm's shares at the beginning of the quarter, expressed as a percentage of the firm's total shares outstanding. Turnover of a firm-quarter is the sum of monthly turnovers of the firm during the quarter, where monthly turnover is share volume in a month divided by total shares outstanding. Size of a firm-quarter is the natural log of the firm's market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. B/M is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the sum of a firm's book equity and deferred tax, divided by the firm's market equity. Ret [-6,-1 ] of a firm-quarter is the firm's six-month buy-and-hold return up to the beginning of the quarter. Beta of a firm-quarter is market beta estimated using market model of daily returns of the firm in the previous year. Adjusted analyst coverage of a firm-quarter is the firm's analyst coverage at the beginning of the quarter. I further calculate size-adjusted analyst coverage of a firm by subtracting average analyst coverage of the firm's corresponding NYSE size quartile. Stock Price of a firm-quarter is price of the firm's stock at the beginning of the quarter. Amihud Illiquidity of a firm-quarter is Amihud (2002) Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . At the beginning of each month, an independent sort is used to rank stocks into deciles of past six-month stock returns and terciles of the FITV measures in the previous quarter. The FITV measure is the percentage of total trading volume accounted for by institutional trading. The two-dimensionally sorted portfolios are then held for six months. I report the time-series means of monthly portfolio returns and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) for the two-dimensional portfolios as well as the differences between winner and loser portfolios (momentum profits). I also report the difference in momentum profits between the top and bottom FITV terciles. To control for microstructure effects, I skip one month before return measurement as did in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 Ret [-6,-1] is the buy-and-hold return of a firm during the six-month period up to the end of previous quarter. Beta is market beta of a firm estimated in the previous year. Size is the natural log of market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Turnover is total turnover of the previous quarter. Analyst Coverage is size-adjusted analyst coverage at the beginning of the quarter. To control for microstructure effects, I skip one month before the return measurement. To ease the comparison of economic significances, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) and transform the independent variables into ranks uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. A cross-sectional regression is estimated each quarter and then the time-series means of the coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. T-statistics are calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors with five lags. The regressions are estimated with constants, which are not reported for brevity. *** , ** , and * represent statistical significances at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) . At the beginning of each month, an independent sort is used to rank stocks into deciles of their earnings shocks and terciles of the FITV measures of the previous quarter. Earnings shock is four-day cumulative abnormal returns in the [-2, 1] window centered on the most recent earnings announcement. The FITV measure is the percentage of total trading volume accounted for by institutional trading. The two-dimensionally sorted portfolios are then held for six months. I report the time-series means of monthly portfolio returns and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) for the two-dimensional portfolios, as well as the differences between the top and bottom deciles of earnings shocks (PEAD Beta is market beta of a firm estimated in the previous year. Size is the natural log of market capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret [-6,-1] is buy-and-hold return of a firm during the six-month period up to the end of previous quarter. To control for microstructure effects, I skip one month before the return measurement. To ease the comparison of economic significances, I follow Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) and transform the independent variables into ranks uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. A cross-sectional regression is estimated each quarter and then the time-series means of the coefficients and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. T-statistics are calculated using Newey-West robust standard errors with five lags. The regressions are estimated with constants, which are not reported for brevity. *** , ** , and * represent statistical significances at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
